#### BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION



## BP-26 Rate Case Workshop September 25-26, 2024 (Day 2)



# Agenda – Sept. 25 (Day 1) – Hybrid

BP-26 Pre-Proceeding Workshop					
Time*	Торіс	Presenter			
9 – 9:10 a.m.	Introduction, Meeting Protocols, Comments and Agenda	Daniel Fisher			
9:10 – 10:30 a.m.	Power Rates Follow Up: • WRAP • UAI • Demand Rate • Tier 2	Steve Bellcoff Leon Nguyen Garth Beavon Scott Reed			
10:30 – 10-40am	Break				
10:40 – 11:10 a.m. 11:10 – 11:30 a.m. 11:30 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.	Power Rates - Electricity Market Price Power Rates - Net Secondary Revenue Forecast Power Rates - ESS	Eric Graesley James LaBelle IV Daniel Fisher & Peter Stiffler			
12:30 – 1:30pm	Lunch				
1:30 – 2:00 p.m. 2:00 – 2:15 p.m. 2:15 – 2:45 p.m. 2:45 – 3:15 p.m.	Power Rates - FCRPS Balancing Capacity with New Canadian Agreement Power Rates – Transmission Costs in Power Rate Power Rates Follow Up - Risk Power Rates Follow Up - Gen Input Capacity Cost	Juergen Bermejo Stephanie Adams Zach Mandell Jonathan Ramse			
	Closing Remarks				

\* Times are approximate

# Agenda – Sept. 26 (Day 2) – Virtual Only


BP-26 Pre-Proceeding Workshop						
Time*	Торіс	Presenter				
10 – 10:10 a.m.	Introduction, Meeting Protocols, Comments and Agenda	Brian McConnell				
10:10 – 11 a.m.	Generation Inputs Rates Shortfall	Eric King, Bill Hendricks, Frank Puyleart				
11 – 11:30 a.m.	Non EIM Balancing	Bill Hendricks, Frank Puyleart				
11:30 – 11:45 a.m.	Utility Delivery Segment Charges	Brian Halbert				
11:45 a.m. – 12 p.m.	Power Rates - Transfer Service Delivery	Dan Yokota and Kim Upham				
	Closing Remarks					

\* Times are approximate

#### Webex Format Update

- BPA has adjusted its public stakeholder virtual engagement approach.
- The Webex format is moving to a "webinar" style.
  - Webex attendees can no longer mute/unmute themselves or enable their webcam.
- The all-chat feature is disabled. Attendees can only message panelists.
  - To participate, attendees must raise their hand (BPA will unmute you to enable your participation), or send a question to panelists in the chat.
- If you are Webex by phone only: press \*3 to request to be unmuted.
- Moderators will continue to address raised hands in the order received.
  - Please continue to state your name and affiliation.
- As necessary, BPA may evolve these procedures and take other measures at its discretion to prevent future disruptions.

#### BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION Proposed BP/TC-26 Pre-Proceeding Workshop Schedule



Procedural schedule dates are draft only

### **Approach to Customer Engagement**

• Most identified issues will be presented according to the following process at workshops (multiple steps might be addressed in a single workshop):



Teams will follow the steps that may be covered in one workshop or more based on the complexity of the issue.

September 25-26, 2024

Pre-Decisional. For Discussion Purposes Only.

#### **Customer Comment Process**

- Thank you to everyone who submitted comments on the Aug. 27-28 workshop topics.
- BPA is using the same comment tracking and response process that was developed in BP/TC-24, which includes the following:
  - All customer comments will be posted to the BP-26 Rate Case website.
  - BPA will create a consolidated customer response (CCR) document for each workshop that will be posted/updated at the same time as other workshop materials.
  - The CCR is organized to address comments listed by the workshop date where the comments were received.
  - The CCR will provide direct responses or identify other forums or future BP/TC-26 workshops where BPA expects to provide a response.
    - To the extent possible, BPA will endeavor to provide responses prior to the next workshop in the Customer Comments section on the BP-26 website (updated CCR will be posted with workshop materials).
  - BPA will not be responding to comments received for the September 25-26 workshop.

#### BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION



# **Balancing Reserves Shortfall**



#### **Balancing Reserves Shortfall**


- The forecast need for balancing reserves in BP-26 has surpassed the planned FCRPS capacity.
  - The planned FCRPS capacity is 900MW INC and 1100MW DEC
  - The BP-26 average capacity is 1127MW INC and 1200MW DEC
- The method for filling the gap has yet to be identified.
- Several options are available for setting rates in BP-26.

#### **Balancing Reserve Components**

- BPA defines balancing reserve capacity as a combination of "regulation" and "non-regulation" capacity.
  - Regulation Capacity (Reg)
    - The difference between actual Load net Generation and the net EIM dispatch operating target (DOT) of Load net Generation
  - Non-Regulation Capacity (Non-Reg)
    - The difference between the net EIM dispatch operating target (DOT) of Load net Generation and expected hourly schedule of Load net Generation
    - BPA makes its Non-Reg portion of its balancing reserve available to the EIM by bidding or designating as Available Balancing Capacity (ABC)
- If the need for balancing reserves surpasses the planned FCRPS capacity, Regulation Capacity will be prioritized over Non-Regulation Capacity.

#### **Balancing Reserve Methodology**

- BPA holds capacity for balancing reserves to meet the NERC standards and OATT requirements to maintain load-resource balance within its balancing authority area.
- Balancing reserves needed for the BPA BAA are set in advance of the start of each rate period.
- BPA performs statistical evaluations of combined load and generation fleet error to yield a final amount of balancing reserve capacity needed to meet BPA's 99.7% planning standard.
- This evaluation captures balancing authority diversity benefits, the difference in timing of INCs and DECs deployed for generators and load.



#### **Balancing Reserve Need**

- BPA sets reserves using the 99.7 percent planning standard to maintain system reliability and comply with NERC standards, while limiting the need to use reliability tools such as OCBR
- In the empirical sciences the <u>three-sigma rule</u>, or empirical rule, states that in a normal distribution, nearly all observed data will fall within three standard deviations (99.7%) of the mean or average of data.
  - Meaning it is empirically useful to treat 99.7% probability as near certainty to set the upper and lower control limits in risk analysis.
- In the EIM, BPA holding a 99.7 percent planning standard ensures that the BPA BA can participate in the market more often by bidding the Non-Reg portion of its balancing reserve available to the EIM to aid in passing the resource sufficiency.
  - Any portion of Non-Reg that is not bid into the market is designated as Available Balancing Capacity (ABC) for use as Reg by the BPA BA

### **BPA's Current Shortfall Approach**

According the Balancing Reserve Capacity Business Practice<sup>1</sup>

- If BPA determines that the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) cannot meet the incremental (INC) capacity amount consistent with the planning standard, BPA will use reasonable efforts to acquire capacity supplied by non-federal sources to meet the planning standard for INC capacity.
- If BPA determines that the FCRPS cannot meet the decremental (DEC) capacity amount consistent with the planning standard, BPA will not make any DEC balancing reserve capacity acquisitions without discussing the need for such acquisitions with customers, unless BPA determines DEC balancing reserve capacity acquisitions are necessary to maintain system reliability.

#### BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION Preliminary BP-26 Capacity Forecast Unrestricted

Month	Total Regulation INC	Total Regulation DEC	Total Non- Regulation INC	Total Non- Regulation DEC	Total INC Balancing Reserves	Total DEC Balancing Reserves
Oct '25	326	-331	381	-474	707	-805
Apr '26	351	-364	413	-500	764	-864
Oct '26	453	-468	495	-567	948	-1,036
Apr '27	625	-661	571	-598	1,196	-1,259
Oct '27	682	-717	705	-721	1,388	-1,438
Apr '28	732	-773	734	-754	1,466	-1,526
Sep '28	737	-776	748	-765	1,485	-1,541
BP-26 Avg	556	-583	571	-617	1,127	-1,200

#### BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION Preliminary BP-26 Capacity Forecast Restricted to Planned Capacity

Month	Total Regulation INC	Total Regulation DEC	Total Non- Regulation INC	Total Non- Regulation DEC	Total INC Balancing Reserves	Total DEC Balancing Reserves
Oct '25	326	-331	381	-474	707	-805
Apr '26	351	-364	413	-500	764	-864
Oct '26	453	-468	447	-567	900	-1,036
Apr '27	625	-661	275	-439	900	-1,100
Oct '27	682	-717	218	-383	900	-1,100
Apr '28	732	-773	168	-327	900	-1,100
Sep '28	737	-776	163	-334	900	-1,100
BP-26 Avg	556	-583	298	-433	854	-1,016

#### **Preliminary BP-26 Capacity Forecast Shortfall**

Month	Total Regulation INC	Total Regulation DEC	Total Non- Regulation INC	Total Non- Regulation DEC	Total INC Balancing Reserves	Total DEC Balancing Reserves
Oct '25	0	0	0	0	0	0
Apr '26	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oct '26	0	0	48	0	48	0
Apr '27	0	0	296	-159	296	-159
Oct '27	0	0	487	-338	487	-338
Apr '28	0	0	566	-427	566	-427
Sep '28	0	0	585	-441	585	-441
BP-26 Avg	0	0	273	-184	273	-184

### Plan to Fill the Shortfall

- BPA is currently assessing how to fill the forecast shortfall for the BP-26 Rate Period.
- Several alternatives have been identified but none have been selected.
  - Multiple methods will most likely be utilized for filling the forecast shortfall for the BP-26 Rate Period.

#### **Alternatives for BP-26 Ratemaking**

- 1. Price the shortfall using power's prices.
- 2. Price the shortfall using other prices.
- 3. Use a formula rate for any additional balancing capacity needs.
- 4. Conduct a mini 7(i) during BP-26, if needed.

## Alternative 1: Price the Shortfall Using Power's Prices

- The entire forecast need for Balancing Reserves would be filled using the prices charged by BPA Power.
  - \$145m will be used for BPA Power's balancing capacity.
  - The Non-Reg INC shortfall would be filled at a price of \$6.05 per kW/mo, creating \$30m which will be used to recover the costs of filling the shortfall.
- Pros
  - Rates would remain consistent throughout the rate period.
- Cons
  - The price that BPA Power charges is generally low compared to the cost of purchasing additional reserves, increasing the chance of under recovery.

#### Preliminary BP-26 Rates – Alternative 1

Rate	Units	BP-24 Rates	BP-26 Rates	Percent Change
RFR				
Regulation and Frequency Response	mills/kWh	0.44	0.45	2.3%
DERBS				
DERBS Inc	mills/kWh	21.30	74.64	250.4%
DERBS Dec	mills/kWh	1.24	0.00	-100.0%
VERBS				
VERBS Wind Regulating	mills/kW-mo	0.36	0.41	14.5%
VERBS Wind Non-Regulating	mills/kW-mo	0.40	0.36	-8.9%
VERBS Solar Regulating	mills/kW-mo	0.28	1.76	524.1%
VERBS Solar Non-Regulating	mills/kW-mo	0.17	0.76	336.8%

#### BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION Alternative 2: Price the Shortfall Using Other Prices

- The forecast need for Balancing Reserves would be filled using the prices charged by BPA Power as well as another price for the shortfall of Non-Reg INC capacity.
  - \$145m will be used for BPA Power's balancing capacity.
  - The Non-Reg INC shortfall would be filled at a price of \$7.04 per kW/mo, creating \$33m which will be used to recover the costs of filling the shortfall.
  - The portion of the forecast supplied by other means would be priced benchmarking the General Electric 7HA.02 combustion turbine at \$7.04 kW/mo. The 7HA.02, along with the Wärtsilä 18V50SG reciprocating generator, are used in the capacity cost methodology to apply a price delta between fast response capacity and slower response capacity. Data for 7HA.02 peaking generator is sourced from the Northwest Power and Conservation Council's Microfin Model.
- Pros
  - Rates would remain consistent throughout the rate period.
- Cons
  - The actual costs of filling the shortfall will most likely differ from these prices, increasing the chance of over/under recovery.

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### **Preliminary BP-26 Rates – Alternative 2**

Rate	Units	BP-24 Rates	BP-26 Rates	Percent Change
RFR				
Regulation and Frequency Response	mills/kWh	0.44	0.46	4.5%
DERBS				
DERBS Inc	mills/kWh	21.30	74.60	250.4%
DERBS Dec	mills/kWh	1.24	0.00	-100.0%
VERBS				
VERBS Wind Regulating	mills/kW-mo	0.36	0.41	14.5%
VERBS Wind Non-Regulating	mills/kW-mo	0.40	0.39	-1.3%
VERBS Solar Regulating	mills/kW-mo	0.28	1.76	524.1%
VERBS Solar Non-Regulating	mills/kW-mo	0.17	0.83	377.0%

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#### **Alternative 3: Formula Rate**

- Rates will be set using the assumption that BPA Power will provide the limit of balancing reserve capacity.
- Any additional funds used to procure or produce additional balancing reserves will be recovered through a formula rate applied to VERBS customers.
- Pros
  - Only costs that are incurred would be charged.
- Cons
  - Additional billing workload.
  - Potentially confusion structure, the Balancing Charge will fluctuate as the cost for purchasing or producing the addition capacity fluctuates.

### **Alternative 3: Formula Rate**

$$Bal. Charge = Cost x \frac{Indv. VERBS. Bill}{Total. VERBS. Bills}$$

- Bal.Charge
  - Balancing Charge The individual customer's monthly charge for purchasing or producing Balancing Reserve Capacity beyond planned FCRPS capacity required to help maintain the power system frequency at 60 Hz and to conform to NERC and WECC reliability standards.
- Cost
  - Total monthly cost of purchasing or producing balancing reserve capacity beyond planned FCRPS capacity required to help maintain the power system frequency at 60 Hz and to conform to NERC and WECC reliability standards.
- Indv.VERBS.Bill
  - Individual VERBS Bill The sum of an individual customer's monthly charges for services pursuant to ACS.III.E.2.
- Total.VERBS.Bills
  - Total VERBS Bills The sum of all monthly charges for services pursuant to ACS.III.E.2

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## Alternative 4: Mini 7(i)

- Rates will be set using the assumption that BPA Power will provide the limit of balancing reserve capacity.
- When the method for filling the shortfall is determined and put in place, BPA will follow a mini-7(i) process to set new VERBS rates.
- Pros
  - Only identified costs will be charged.
- Cons
  - Administratively burdensome.
  - Potentially confusing, rates would change during the rate period.

#### BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION Preliminary BP-26 Base Rates – Alternatives 3 & 4

Rate	Units	BP-24 Rates	BP-26 Rates	Percent Change
RFR				
Regulation and Frequency Response	mills/kWh	0.44	0.45	2.3%
DERBS				
DERBS Inc	mills/kWh	21.30	74.64	250.4%
DERBS Dec	mills/kWh	1.24	0.00	-100.0%
VERBS				
VERBS Wind Regulating	mills/kW-mo	0.36	0.41	14.5%
VERBS Wind Non-Regulating	mills/kW-mo	0.40	0.15	-62.0%
VERBS Solar Regulating	mills/kW-mo	0.28	1.76	524.1%
VERBS Solar Non-Regulating	mills/kW-mo	0.17	0.18	3.4%

September 25-26, 2024

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## **Staff Leaning for BP-26**

• Alternative 3: Use a formula rate for any additional balancing capacity needs.

#### ST R A В Т 0 0 N Ν Ε Ε 0 W E R D Μ Ν



# **Questions?**



#### BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION



# **Non-EIM Balancing**



## **Steps Covered Today**

- Step 5: Discussion of customer feedback to alternatives and BPA's response
- Step 6: Staff proposal for solution

#### Refresher

- Generating resources might be causing an imbalance on the BPA BA without being assessed any charges for the imbalance caused.
- BPA has identified several network model parameter mismatches that can create imbalance not seen by the EIM
  - Base Schedule Mismatch
  - Outage Sync Issues
- It is possible that more situations could arise that have yet to be seen.
- Assessing charges associated with these imbalances would require a change to the rate schedule, tariff, and business practices.

# Step 5

# Discussion of customer feedback to alternatives and BPA's response



### **Customer Comments**

#### • Seattle City Light – *full comments*

- City Light supports the proposed Option 2: General Language and agrees that this should include language regarding recovering imbalance costs not assessed through EIM. City Light suggests that the Locational Marginal Prices (LMP) should be used for imbalance cost recovery if available. If an LMP is not available, using the EIM Load Aggregation Point (ELAP) should be used for imbalance cost recovery.
- City Light additionally suggests that BPA include an appeal process for Non-EIM Balancing charges like the UIC appeal process.

#### **Customer Comments**

#### • Avangrid – partial comments

- Avangrid appreciates Bonneville's adherence to cost causation principles but is not able to recommend one option over the other given the amount of information presented to date, and is not convinced that this issue would be best remedied with a new rate schedule. It is not yet clear how customers would be made aware that they were causing these charges or whether passing the charges along to generators is appropriate in all circumstances
- Additionally, Avangrid agrees with comments from stakeholders at the June Workshop that given this lack of understanding and transparency, Bonneville's proposed alternatives would benefit from some type of appeal process.
- Should Bonneville proceed with a new rate schedule, Avangrid recommends the agency identify a process or mechanism to ensure that the agency isn't over (or under) collecting in situations where improved data exchanges or system alignment would avoid incurring any such EIM imbalance charges.

#### **Customer Comments**

- NIPPC and RNW Joint Comments *partial comments* 
  - If BPA moves forward with an out-of-market imbalance settlement mechanism, NIPPC and RNW expect that any such mechanism would not be limited to charging customers but would also allocate credits for imbalance energy to customers when appropriate.
  - NIPPC and RNW also agree with the suggestion from WPAG at the workshop that any outof-market settlement mechanism for imbalance charges (or credits) should include a dispute resolution mechanism for customers to challenge BPA's allocations.
  - We note that generation imbalance customers themselves have an easy option to mitigate the "Base Schedule Mismatch" scenario that BPA described. In short, customers can ensure that the pMax on file with the CAISO accurately represents their units' maximum output.
  - More difficult is the "Outage Sync" issue. In these situations, BPA described circumstances where the market communication mechanisms are coordinated poorly and customers – through no fault of their own – may receive an imbalance charge or credit through the market that does not accurately reflect a given customer's actual imbalance for an interval

# Step 6

#### Staff proposal for solution



#### **Alternatives**

Adding language to the tariff, rate schedule and business practices for these instances will be necessary to recover the cost for any GI charges that are not currently being assessed.

- Option 1: Specific language
  - Added to ensure that GI charges will be assessed when specific instances arise
  - If a situation will be ongoing and easily identified, adding specific language is preferred

#### • Option 2: General language

- Added to specify that any imbalance caused on BPA's BA that is not being assessed through the EIM will be recovered at the EIM Load Aggregation Point (ELAP)
- ELAP is the average Locational Marginal Price (LMP) across the hour and across all nodes in the BAA
- If a situation is sporadic or unknown, general language would ensure that all costs associated with imbalance caused could be recovered

#### Rate Schedule Language

# ACS Rate Schedule, Section IV H. Non-EIM Balancing Rate

In addition to the charges or payments under ACS IV.A, a Transmission Customer shall be charged or paid for GI Service, if any component of the Transmission Customer Base Schedule used by the MO for settlement differs from the components of the Transmission Customer Base Schedule submitted to the BPA EIM entity.

The rate for Non-EIM Balancing shall be the same PNode RTD price used to calculate charges under ACS IV.A for the same time period.

#### ST R A В Т 0 0 N Ν Ε Ε 0 W E R D Μ Ν



# **Questions?**



#### BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION



# **Utility Delivery Roll-In Proposal**



## **Regional Engagement**

#### Norms for Engaging the Region on Issues

• Most issues are presented according to the following process at workshops (multiple steps might be addressed in a single workshop):

Step 1: Introduction and education

Step 2: Description of the issue

Step 3: Data and/or analysis that supports the issue

Step 4: Discussions on possible alternatives to solve issue

Step 5: Discussion of customer feedback to alternatives and BPA's response

Step 6: Staff proposal for solution

# **BP-26 Utility Delivery Timeline**

#### • Previously

- April 24 Segmentation Workshop BPA initially proposed no segmentation changes for BP-26.
- July 11 Customer-led workshop PNGC and NRU proposed rolling Utility Delivery into the Network segment.
- Prior workshop materials available at BP-26 Rate Case website.
- Sept. 26 Workshop Presenting staff leaning: proposing Utility Delivery segment roll-in to Network.
  - Further customer comment encouraged.
- Adoption and Implementation to be determined in the BP-26 rate case.

#### **Status Quo and Alternatives**

- Status Quo Maintains 'Utility Delivery' as a separate segment from the Network, with an associated rate.
- Alternative 1 Roll Utility Delivery into the Network Segment
- Alternative 2 Roll Utility Delivery segmented costs directly into the Network Integration rate (excluding PTP)

#### **Balancing Roll-in Factors**

"Segmentation fundamentally concerns the allocation of costs among customers, which is part of rate design. This allocation should be based on BPA's various statutory directives and policies, and should be structured to achieve the best possible balance among them." (BP-16-A-02).

#### 1. Consistent with statutory requirements

- a. Full and timely cost recovery (same for all alternatives)
- b. BPA's rates are based on total system costs (same for all alternatives)
- c. Equitable allocation between Federal and non-Federal uses of the transmission system (same for all alternatives)
- d. Encourages the widest possible diversified use of electric power at the lowest possible rates to consumers consistent with sound business principles

#### 2. Consistent with ratemaking principles (from BP-22)

- a. Cost causation fairly allocate costs to customers based on proportionate use.
- b. Simplicity, clarity, transparent public process, and feasibility of application and implementation.
- c. Overall rate shock and rate stability from rate period to rate period.

# Why Roll-in?

- UD is a pancake rate on a small group of customers (~29 entities).
  - Significant impact on their bill (~50% of total bill for some of them)
  - Significant chance of rate shocks (magnified by small group)
- Effect of roll-in on overall rates is small (~0.4%), removes smallgroup shocks.
- Past actions have minimized roll-in effect on overall rates.
- Incentive to divest UD no longer available.

#### **Customer Comment**

#### • One comment (AWEC) received:

 "This proposal has been opposed by many customers and rejected by BPA in the past on the grounds that it would shift costs that have been incurred to serve individual utilities into network rates, requiring all user of the network segment to subsidize specific utilities that find it hard to bear the costs of facilities created specifically to serve them alone.
AWEC is sympathetic to the plight of a small group of customers paying a rate that feels painful and outsized but encourages BPA to look for other options for addressing this pain point that do not involve simply creating a subsidy when it comes back to stakeholders as part of its September meeting."

# Why Not Roll-in?

- Assigns costs for a specific service to customers not receiving the service.
  - Not unique to low voltage transformation, no customer uses every network facility directly.
  - Small effect (<1%), minimized by past actions.
- Breaks from past decisions.
  - Largest change is de-facto end of purchase incentive.
  - Incentive has been successful in minimizing cost of roll-in.
  - Looking ahead to market/regional coordination.
- "Distribution Substation Charge" is relatively standard across the region.
  - Other TSPs (with distribution networks) following suit could affect Transfer costs.
  - Size of effect would requires study, but could be e.g. >25% increase to NT/PTP rates among competitors with larger distribution systems.
  - BPA does not have a similar distribution network.

### **Staff Leaning**

#### • Staff support Roll-In vs Status Quo.

- Best balance of all factors; postage-stamp approach to costs, simplicity, and avoiding rate shocks outweigh cost allocation/subsidization.
- Previous divestment has minimized cost allocation impact, with little further reduction possible.
- Alternative 1 preferred to Alternative 2.
  - Within segment cost allocation already addressed by NT vs PTP rate design (costs allocated by NT vs PTP demand).
  - Some UD customers use PTP instead of NT.
  - More complicated implementation.
- Therefore, Staff proposes to introduce Alternative 1 (rolling UD into the Network) during BP-26 Initial Proposal.

#### ST R A В Т 0 0 N Ν Ε Ε 0 W E R D Μ Ν




# **Questions?**



#### **Appendix – Purchase Incentive**

UD Facilities Sold by Fiscal Year



#### **Appendix – UD Rate Increases**

- BP-26: UD is expecting a ~79% rate increase (a combination of held-over increase during BP-22, increasing costs across two rate cases, and decreasing demand when additional customers left the subgroup).
- 2. BP-24: Settled, with Rates held at BP-22 levels.
- 3. BP-22: Final Rate \$19.86/kW/yr. Rate increase limited to 25%, excess costs allocated to Network
- 4. BP-20: Final Rate \$15.89 /kW/yr.
- 5. BP-18: Final Rate \$15.40 /kW/yr.
- 6. BP-16: Final Rate \$15.42 /kW/yr.
- 7. BP-16 Initial Proposal would have been \$20.99 /kW/yr prior to segmentation redesign.
- 8. Segmentation Methodology differed significantly prior to BP-16; In general the same pattern held, with the Utility Delivery rate not being expected to fully recover associated segmented costs.

#### BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION



# Transfer Service Delivery Charge (TSDC)



### **Transfer Service Delivery Charge(TSDC)**

- This charge is applied to transfer customers with low-voltage delivery (below 34.5 kV) to recover costs charged by 3<sup>rd</sup> party transfer providers.
- BPA Transmission has a similar charge called the utility delivery charge (UDC).
- If Transmission's UDC is rolled into transmission rates, power will similarly roll the TSDC into power rates.

#### **Meeting Wrap Up and Next Steps**

- Please send any feedback, with the topic you are addressing to BPA's Tech Forum at <u>techforum@bpa.gov</u>, by October 9, with a cc to your Power and/or Transmission Account Executive.
- BPA will not be responding to comments for this workshop.

### Near-Term Schedule (Proposed)

- Oct. 23 (Wed) Training on BPA's new secure portal
- Nov. 13 (Wed) Federal Register Notices for BP-26 and TC-26 published
- Nov. 15 (Fri) Prehearing Conferences for BP-26 and TC-26
- Nov. 15 (Fri) TC-26 Initial Proposal issued
- Nov. 22 (Fri) BP-26 Initial Proposal issued